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1 Introduction
The multiple crises of the last two decades provide an ideal testing ground to iden-
tify systemic risks facing global equity markets. Understanding systemic risks using
empirical tests on contagion, spillovers and financial networks has been a long stand-
ing research question. While the literature stretches back as early as King et al.
(1994) on spillovers and Allen and Gale (1998) on contagion, the empirical litera-
ture on networks and financial spillovers is more recent. Allen and Gale (2000) and
Gai and Kapadia (2010) evaluated network effects within the financial sector, while
Acemoglu et al. (2015) showed, how real economy shocks can become the source of
crises that spread dramatically via financial interconnectedness as ‘fragility’, affecting
otherwise ‘robust’ networks. Empirical representations show how the networks them-
selves change over time, between calm and crisis periods, and with the development
and growth of emerging financial markets (Billio et al., 2012; Khandani et al., 2013;
Demirer et al., 2018a). The changing nature of the links between those institutions
can be considered a measure of contagion (Dungey and Gajurel, 2015), while the links
between spillovers and networks are highlighted in Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) via
unsigned forecast error variance decompositions providing a single index of system’s
vulnerability. This paper overcomes the limitations of the unsigned single vulnerabil-
ity index by highlighting vulnerability via newly proposed identification approaches
using the signed return spillover index (Dungey et al., 2017b) complemented with a
novel signed volatility spillover index.
We investigate spillover patterns in the global equity market using the Diebold
and Yilmaz (DY) connectedness index (Yilmaz et al., 2018; Demirer et al., 2018c,b;
Yilmaz, 2017; Diebold et al., 2017; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015; Diebold and Yılmaz,
2014) and the multivariate historic decomposition (MHD) index (Dungey et al.,
2017b). The DY provides information on the direction and size of spillovers, while
the MHD provides the direction, size and sign, that is, whether the linkages dampen
or amplify shock transmission. We calibrate the MHD further by the estimating
signed index with realised variances, and separate out the self exciting transitory
signed volatility evolution from the signed return spillovers with our proposed signed
volatility decomposition (SVD). This approach can be considered as an extension of
vulnerability and transmission representations with MHD.
This paper makes several contributions into the current domain. First, we propose
a risk matrix that also identifies out sources of crisis. Then, we provide a rationale
regarding the recent surge in speculation around crisis sources, and explore whether
there is enough evidence aligning with these postulations. We examine if China
is a potential source of crisis as suggested in Engle (2018). We produce evidence
that it is unlikely that China will trigger a financial crisis any time soon. Finally,
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we address some key questions that have long puzzled researchers. Can we extract
more contagious markets out of sample clusters? Are these markets generating crisis
episodes drawn towards a continuum conducive to predictive patterns? How diabolic
are contagion patterns in more recent times compared to before? Can we disentangle
substantially large contagion patterns driving global economies towards a potential
crisis? Identifying potential sources of contagion and patterns underpinning conta-
gious markets will allow regulators to take timely action attenuating the exposure of
domestic markets to a large-scale crisis.
A primary objective of this paper is to show that signed risk measures are better
suited to model crises then popular unsigned risk measures. It examines market
dynamics across all episodes of crisis and compare the derived signals with actual
events juxtaposed against popular unsigned risk measures. Such comparison con-
centrates out the degree of mis-identification if crisis modelling is reliant on a single
framework, and more then one framework may not only complement each others’
findings but also reduce the gaps in the outcome. Hence, this objective addresses
that running multiple important risk analysis frameworks simultaneously may have
important implications in understanding both the degree and direction of crisis and
in better modelling of crisis episodes.
A secondary objective of this paper is to detect major contagious markets in the
past and newly emerging contagious markets using a single framework. A major gap
in extant literature is the effects of ‘interdependence’ is often enveloped within the
potential effects coming from ‘contagion’, and as such is not well studied. This gives
rise to a bias resulting from heteroscedasticty and often leading to failure in adopting
a proper policy response to an imminent crisis. Interdependence bears less negative
connotation compared to contagion and the voluminous literature simply fails to
incorporate major perspectives in crisis studies. This has resulted in an abundance
of incomplete crisis examinations. Among the 124 papers reviewed in the taxonomy
of Seth and Panda (2018), only 4 mention contagion, interdependence and integra-
tion. Simultaneous increase in volatility facing a crisis is often wrongly attributed as
resulting from contagion. It is because such amplifications in risks pertains to interde-
pendence and overcasts the effect of contagion for a particular market. An important
significance of the current paper is that we propose a tractable novel approach build-
ing on methods we have been experimenting with, that separates contagion effects
out of effects due to interdependence, yet offers better crisis demarcation without
prior knowledge on crisis.
More recently, Dungey and Renault (2018) relying on Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002)
findings showed how to distinguish contagion from interdependence. Dungey and Re-
nault (2018) suggested that swings in the volatility of common factors may transpire
from reasons pertaining to ‘source’ or ‘target’ markets and may induce simultane-
ous volatility jumps. The evolution of innovations in one entity that is immediately
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reflected in another when a crisis does not precede and as such may not pertain to
contagion. However, a crisis period co-movement in volatility requires careful explo-
ration, as volatility in the common factor of a ‘target’ itself may overcast the effects
coming from the ‘source’. In our work, we adopt a combined yet simpler approach
considering the nexus between two issues and, distinguishing markets with different
levels of contagion.
A novelty in our method is that crisis demarcation is not a necessary condition
for contagion identification, unlike earlier methods. We do not need to concur with
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in knowing the crisis and calm periods to separate con-
tagion from interdependence. We support the work of Dungey and Renault (2018)
while progressing the current tenet by identifying the more contagious markets from
the less contagious or not contagious markets with a single approach. This is a
key contribution to the current literature investigating the real time evolution of
contagion and, by extension, the early warning literature.
We apply DY, MHD and Signed Volatility Decomposition (SVD) approaches to a
large panel of international equity markets. The DY provides a profile of increasing
spillover effects between the markets across the sample period, highlighting periods
of change in the intensity for these effects. However, the DY is limited in identifying
the direction of contemporaneous risk measures. MHD analysis enhances the DY by
identifying linkages between markets that amplify or dampen shocks and, further,
how the system of markets fluctuates around the average relationship by accumulat-
ing shocks over time. MHD helps discerning negative in-shocks from positive out-
shocks with signs. SVD analysis complements MHD by calibrating the model with
innovations from realised variance estimates put into an impulse response framework.
The results are robust to different rolling sample sizes and data frequencies.
We use a balanced sample of 30 financial markets in this paper1. We classify the
markets into export crisis (EC) markets (i.e., leaders in commodity export), oil ex-
porters into both emerging (OEE) and developed (OED) markets, European markets
that have been directly affected by the Greek crisis (GC) of 2010 onwards and high-
yield Asia–Pacific markets directly affected by the Asian crisis (AC) of 1997–1998.
We also include in the OED group the so-called conduit markets of the USA and
Japan (BIS, 1998; Baur and Schulze, 2005). Table 3 provides the classification of
the markets into five clusters, which is common in the literature. Our results also
allow us to focus on the potential risks of crisis, and the emergence of China as an
important conduit market as outlined in a number of studies (Elliott, 2017; Mullen,
2017; Quijones, 2017; Mauldin, 2017; Friedman, 2016; Jolly and Bradsher, 2015).
We identify the most crisis-prone markets and explain how the effect of innova-
1Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,Chile, China, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea,
Sri-Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, the USA and the UK
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tions in these markets are different from the less crisis-prone markets. The inclusion
of an oil index allows us to examine the system’s sensitivity to shocks, especially
during periods of stress in oil supplies. The stress coming from exogenous shocks are
examined only with the unsigned spillover measure.
Finally, five important questions concerning the time-varying nature of systemic
risk estimates leading to the detection of crisis transmission patterns are addressed.
First, we examine whether policy interventions that restrict significant transmission
paths help interconnected financial markets to deal with shocks. Second, we find
that the changing interactions between markets result in changing patterns of shock
spillovers. Third, we examine whether it is possible to detect which markets are
more shock resistant in the sample period from 1998–2017. Fourth, we determine
if a parametric signed identification approach can be used as an extension to the
unsigned identification approach of return spillovers. Fifth, we examine if signed
indices2 identify self-exciting volatility transmissions and return transmissions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses a history
of crisis episodes across the global equity market. Section 3 presents the empirical
framework concerning GVD, static and dynamic networks, MHD and SVD. Section 4
outlines the dataset, consisting of 30 equity markets, the oil index and the commod-
ity index. This section also presents the filtering method and descriptive statistics
on filtered data. Section 5 discusses the empirical results based on ‘system-wide con-
nectedness’ and the resultant network among the markets, before following on to the
dynamic analysis and MHD measures explaining the effect of positive and negative
shocks in the sample markets. We compare the results of MHD with SVD in this
section. Section 6 presents the conclusion to this paper.
2 A brief history of crises episodes in global equity markets
2.1 Asian crisis
With the unveiling of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, supervisors attempted to
stem the falling markets by responding differently from each other. As the ground
zero of the crisis, Thailand adopted a structural adjustment package. The crisis dis-
proportionately affected other countries, driving the supervisors of Malaysia, Indone-
sia and South Korea to adopt policies pulling in different directions. While Malaysia
reverted to a fixed exchange regime, Indonesia’s inflation targeting policy and South
Korea’s currency devaluation floated the exchange rates in both the countries (Khan
and Park, 2009). Among others, Singapore continued with its managed currency
float, while Chinese authorities avoided any degree of intervention into the markets
2This yields realised volatility transmissions within a system.
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(Raghavan and Dungey, 2015). While the Asian markets successfully stopped the
crisis from propagating further, the resulting changes in the interconnections within
and outside the markets provided a clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses
of the AC cluster.
2.2 War and oil shock
The extant literature posits a perennial question associating war with crisis. Major
relevant studies have attributed this to holding either a ‘liberalist’ view or ‘realist’
view, taking opposite stands while describing the economic costs of war (Morrow,
1997; Barbieri, 2002; Li and Sacko, 2002; Schneider and Troeger, 2006b). As war
erupts, provided there is heightening of military goods trade relative to little or no
drop in bilateral trade, Morrow (1997); Barbieri and Levy (1999); Barbieri (2002)
supported the ‘relative gain’ concept. Albeit belonging to the liberalist view, Schnei-
der and Troeger (2006a) supported the realist view provided short-term spikes in
financial markets reflected increased investor confidence. This is partly due to in-
vestors’ belief that positive anticipation of war outcome is conducive to escalating
trade and asset returns. This anticipation also held for higher oil returns during the
Iraq invasion. However, there exists little empirical evidence in the extant literature
in support or in opposition to this view, resulting mostly in exacerbation or downplay
of the true economic casualty that may emerge from war.
Li and Sacko (2002) and Schneider and Troeger (2006a) also presented two finan-
cial market scenarios with fundamental models prevailing in finance. If a long term
uncertainty is associated with a conflict, investors collectively sell off stocks and seek
investment into less risky assets elsewhere, sending local markets into a cascade. In
contrast, positive expectations stemming from news related to the quick resolution
of war may increase investment as higher returns are attributed to the winning of
war. In any case, all different views in outbreak of the wars affecting financial mar-
kets converge into an accord that war has a negative effect on economic exchange
(Barbieri and Levy, 1999; Barbieri, 2002).
Rigobon and Sack (2005) reported a subsequent decline in the equity prices, trea-
sury yields and dollar rates as the USA invaded Iraq. Leigh et al. (2003) provided
an extension to gauge the direction of equity investments from a ‘Saddam Security’
futures, suggesting a global decline in asset values once the full extent of effect of
Iraq is realised. This also lends support to heightened capital flights as explained
by Schneider and Troeger (2006a), causing increased connectedness and systemic
risk. Schneider and Troeger (2006a) further suggested that investors generally fail to
adapt to prolonged political uncertainty, and this is reiterated by transmitting crisis
globally, especially through stock markets.
6
Leigh et al. (2003) provided a rationalisation for cascading international equity
markets resulting from systemic transmission of crisis immediately after the Iraq
invasion. For each 10 per cent increase in the probability of war the drop in the
the stock prices of Germany, Sweden, Taiwan, Israel, Venezuela and, Hong Kong
accounts for over 3 per cent. The price drops for the USA, Portugal, Netherlands,
Singapore, China, France, the Philippines, the UK, Russia, Norway, Canada remains
within 2 to 3 per cent. Australia, Belgium, Chile, Thailand, India, Japan, Greece,
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Austria and, Indonesia are burdened with 1 to 2 per cent drops
in asset prices. Indeed, as the war deepens longer than expected, the drops continue
to escalate for each additional degree of probability, sending many markets into a
downward spiral.
Leach (2003) addressed the conditions in Japan and the European Union zone
particularly concerning the worsening economic spirals transmitted by the USA re-
cession. In the past, the buoyant Japanese and the European Union stock markets
successfully offset crisis build-up when the USA was at war with Vietnam, and vice
versa. However, in the impending Iraq invasion period, both economies were sub-
merged in domestic crises that were compounded by the burdening Iraq War. The
systemic failure in the Japanese economy was well advanced, with bank loan defaults
adding upto 35 per cent of its GDP, leading to cascades of bank failures. This sit-
uation escalated with constraints imposed on further stimulus facing a phenomenal
public debt level. The Eurozone faced imposing fiscal constraints outlined in the
‘Growth and stability pack’ coupled with accelerated inflation as Germany slipped
into recession.
In contemplating the global economic contraction facing a war-like crisis between
two players, a key state variable is oil price fluctuation. Leach (2003) held that
because the cost of oil is implicit in the cost of business, the conflicting inflationary
pressure on the oil market that conflicts leads to contractionary monetary policies
that hike interest rates. This, in turn, spurs unemployment and sets the economy
off on a cascade. The downturn is severe, particularly for oil exporting countries,
and results from exchange rate jumps that is termed as the ‘petrocurrency effect’.
Nordhaus (2002) presented a predictive analysis for the USA market; in the advent of
an Iraq-invasion, that an oil shock may bring about a US$17 billion gain compared to
a US$800 billion loss in the years that follow the invasion. In this study, we attempt
to disentangle the oil effect in gauging systemic risks by including oil as an entity in
the system.
The number of commentator concerns over the issue of war causing oil price fluctu-
ation subsided as the GFC ensued. Early 2006 marked a period of general buoyancy
in the markets across all sectors. Lending contractions in the financial sector that
followed were due in large part to the unprecedented level of subprime mortgages,
which led to the entire USA economy becoming susceptible to an imminent melt-
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down.. Dungey et al. (2018c) illustrated that, despite the economy facing an overall
subprime crisis, the abrupt offloading of risky exposures through credit risk transfers
only exacerbated the economic downturn. In the full form of the USA subprime crisis
in September 2008, several leading investment institutions started to feel the pinch
with a series of events, which led to the Lehmann Brother bankruptcy, sheer fall of
mortgage-backed securities reflected in the ABX index, government bailing the AIG
out and taking Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over. While in the US, supervisors
tried to control the swings of crisis with bailout packages and a TARP contract, the
high degree of international investments into the cascading USA mortgage backed
securities sent markets across borders into a downward spiral.
2.3 Eurozone crisis
The fiscal crisis in Greece in 2009 mutated into a deep recession through a sovereign
debt crisis. The announcement of Greece’s budget deficit had increased to five times
higher than the target stipulated by Growth and Stability Pact spurred fear over the
future of eurozone. Matsaganis (2013) held that with the adoption of new austerity
measures by the local government in the following years, coupled with depletion
of Greece’s credit rating, investors naturally cause further degradation of returns
on investment in Greek market. This resulted in cascading capital in the Greek
market that pushed the economy into a solvency crisis. The conditions to adopt more
austerity measures that came with bailout packages by the International Monetary
Fund and the European Union only exacerbated the worsening spiral for Greece.
Consequently, by the end of 2013, the Greek standard of living had dropped to 34.3
per cent below average (Matsaganis, 2013). This crisis had spread quickly, with
Spain and Portugal each losing about 8 per cent living standards. The economic
contraction, as indicated in the Eurostat statistics database, stood at 23.5 per cent
for Greece, and had simultaneously contracted the economies of Spain by 5.5 per cent,
Portugal by 7.4 per cent, Italy by 7.8 per cent and Ireland by 5 per cent (Matsaganis,
2013).
The escalating European debt crisis provided an ideal foundation from which to
investigate the channels of GFC that expedited European debt crisis’s build-up. The
work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) is considered the first to have proposed causal
connections between the banking and debt crisis. While endorsing this concept, Can-
delon and Palm (2010); Angeloni and Wolff (2012) and De Bruyckere et al. (2013)
empirically established the notion that the subprime crisis mutated into sovereign
debt crisis, rationalising the systematic build-up of the European crisis stemming
from the GFC. Recently, Calabrese et al. (2017) indicated that systemic risk due
to simultaneous debt holdings between Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and, Spain
(GIIPS) was responsible for spurring the European debt crisis. Rusˇcˇa´kova´ and Se-
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mancˇ´ıkova´ (2016) classified the crisis channels into banking and fiscal.
Risks generated from the financial sector disproportionately affect the real econ-
omy, especially when the effects of financial sector stocks are separated from non-
financial stocks, as Dungey and Renault (2018) suggested. By disentangling risk
transmission from different sectors in the USA stock markets, Dungey et al. (2018c)
provided evidence that non-financial sector equities shield the real economy as a crisis
intensifies. Having access to alternative sources of credit, non-financial sector port-
folios decouple with the heightening of systemic risk, and provide a partial hedge to
domestic investors. This finding explains how some smaller economies with a dispro-
portionate allocation of financial sector and non-financial sector undertakings offset
the effects of crisis despite domestic banks bearing the full brunt of a crisis emitting
from global banks and not the other way around.
More recently, Dungey et al. (2018a) provided the rational that all euro-zone
markets do not have the same reassessment for potential default risk. Dungey et al.
(2018a) found evidence for prolonged crisis regimes with ‘durations’ of high-volatility
for GIIP, including Belgium, Spain and Netherlands. Conversely, crisis regimes for
Germany and, the UK were more short-lived. Moreover, Dungey and Renault (2018)
asserted that Germany provides a safe haven during crisis, as markets susceptible to
volatility resulting from contagion distance themselves somewhat from Germany.
2.4 The emergence of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC)
The relative importance of systemic risk pertaining to interdependence, or risk emerg-
ing from sufficiently proximate contemporaneous small shocks for Brazil, Russia,
India and China (BRIC) is, a priori, attributable to their recent transformation
into leading investment avenues. The impetus given by the utmost global depository
receipt issuance, coupled with hasty equity market liberalisation, positioned the Chi-
nese (Shanghai Stock Exchange) and Indian (Bombay Stock Exchange) markets as
the fourth- and fifth-largest trading platforms in the world. However, these markets
did not suffer from the same market reassessment of default risk when faced with
the 2007 meltdown, as India and Russia observed a sharp increase in negative in-
flows while for China, these inflows remained positive (Chittedi, 2014). This led to
a cascade, as liquidity that drained from the emerging markets brought about local
currencies falling sharply against dollars (Ferreiro and Serrano, 2011).
There is a strand of literature both supports and contradicts such views. Im-
mediately following GFC, Dooley and Hutchison (2009) and Dimitriou et al. (2013)
dismissed contagion transmissions into BRIC, including East Asia emanating from
the US. More recently, Wang (2014) and Syriopoulos et al. (2015) complemented this
notion by finding increased interconnections between the USA and East Asian mar-
kets alongside their BRIC counterparts; however, this was observed only after the
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GFC. In contrast, Bekiros (2014) found that contagion spurred the relevant markets
with the unfolding of GFC.
2.5 Equity shortfall in Europe during GFC
Similar to BRIC and the Asian markets, capital flights from equity markets of Eastern
Europe in the advent of the GFC pushed the market values of stocks down by 50 per
cent. Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011) asserted that institutional investors shifting
investment preferences from stocks and bonds to treasury bills, with the preceding in-
vestment withdrawal from institutional to investor-managed, emerging market hedge
funds and private equity by investors as the USA subprime crisis unfolded exacer-
bated crisis transmission and contagion in the emerging Eastern European markets.
Evidently, connectivity between emerging and European export dominant countries
had resurfaced, especially with Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA (Syriopoulos,
2007; Lucey and Voronkova, 2008; Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2010).
3 Empirical framework
3.1 Diebold and Yilmaz spillover index (DY)
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) proposed a VAR forecast error variance decompositions
(FEVD) to compute DY spillover indices. The FEVD matrix is termed as the adja-
cency matrix (or ‘connectedness matrix’), where orthogonal shocks are projected on
N co-variance stationary variables. Across the rows and down the columns give signs
of in-shocks to the targets and effects of out-shocks to potential recipients. Summing
up all non-diagonal elements of the decomposition gives unconditional variances in
a squared matrix.
From a VAR(p) of the form3
xt =
p∑
i=1
ϕixt−i + εt (1)
Here xt is the returns vector xt = (x1.t,....xN.t)
′, ϕ is a N ×N parameter matrix and
εt ∼ N(0, Σ) the moving average representation is
xt =
∞∑
i=0
Aiεt−i. (2)
3An intercept is suppressed for simplicity and without loss of generality.
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Here,
Ai = φ1Ai−1 + φ2Ai−2 + . . .+ φPAi−p
From here we can extend
xt =
∞∑
i=0
(AiP )
(
P−1εt−1
)
=
∞∑
i=0
(AiP ) (ε˜t−i) =
∑
i=0
A˜iε˜t−i (3)
P is a lower triangular Cholesky matrix. Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) propose using
the H-step-ahead forecast error variance decomposition (GVD) that is constructed
from VAR (see (Koop et al., 1996)) to circumvent the order dependence issue. We
denote this GVD by θgij (H) and that gives
θgij (H) =
a−1jj
∑H−1
h=0
(
e
′
iAh
∑
ej
)2∑H−1
h=0
(
e
′
iAh
∑
A
′
hej
) (4)
Here, the co-variance is
∑
and ajj is square root of error variance of j th equation
and in the ith element, Ah is the moving average coefficient from VAR and ej is a
selection vector of ones.
Now
∑N
j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) 6= 1. However, after normalizing, the rows in the FEVD matrix
gives
θ˜gij (H) =
θgij (H)∑N
j=1 θ
g
ij (H)
(5)
in which we get
∑N
j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) = N .
The static spillover or the unconditional variances are computed by taking the sum
of off-diagonal elements as proportion of sum of all elements, representing system
wide connectedness. Notably, the directional spillover index identifies the return
spillover of all other markets to market i
Si←all (H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i θ˜
g
ij (H)
N
× 100. (6)
The return spillover from market i to the other markets in reverse gives by simply
transforming to
Si→all (H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=1 θ˜
g
ji (H)
N
× 100. (7)
Pairwise directional connectedness identifies gross shock transmission to and from
the markets in a holistic associated framework of networked data which is
Sgi (H) = S
g
i. (H)− Sg.i (H) . (8)
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3.2 Multivariate historical decomposition (MHD)
MHD, pioneered by Dungey et al. (2017a), produces a signed contribution of shocks
from one to another that captures the magnifying and dampening effects of con-
temporaneous shocks in the intertwined markets. Here, the connectedness elements
measured with Bij explain the fraction of variation of i due to shocks in j at time t
(excluding self-loops in a network). The parameters are estimated from the following
VAR
xt =
k∑
i=1
φixt−i + εt (9)
Here, xt = [x1,t . . . xn,t]
T . Next, re-writing the reduced form VAR with disturbances
and representing with moving averages we have
xt = initial values +
∞∑
i=0
Siεt−i (10)
Here, Sj = ϕ1ϕj−1 + ϕ2sj−2 + . . . with j = 1, 2, ... ,S0 = IN and Sj = 0 for j < 0.
Re-writing this equation for any individual element xj,t , which can be explained
with contributions of all other elements, the third step, represents the historical
decomposition of j at time t. This is presented in the equation as follows,
HDt+j =
j−1∑
i=0
IRFi  γt+j−i +
∞∑
i=j
IRFi  γt+j−i (11)
Here, γt+j−i = [εt+j−i, ...εt+j−i] is an N×N sized residual matrix, with N representing
the length of a vector. IRF s’ are one unit impulse responses (non-orthogonalised)
and  is the Hadamard product. The estimated MHD produces an N × N sized
matrix providing negative in-shocks across the rows and positive out-shocks down the
columns of the matrix without any sign restriction. This approach accommodates
the non-linear dynamics of the data.
MHD produces signed weights of shocks throughout the channels, as a function
of impulse responses weighted by residuals εt. The system uses unconditional vari-
ance estimates as innovations for the impulse response estimates and, as such, are
considered to represent spillovers in the returns of the variances.
3.3 Signed volatility decomposition
In this section we propose SVD extracting spillover information drawn from realised
variances associated with volatility transmissions within networks. We take the dif-
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ference between return and volatility spillovers to identify whether a particular mar-
ket is driven more by intrinsic volatility than by risks emerging from the network.
We take a non-parametric approach to estimate SVD, which follows the same
algorithm as MHD. Unlike MHD computed from daily returns, we compute MHD
from realised variance drawing from five-minute intervals in prices and, as such, the
historic decomposition is depicted as SVD.
We begin by calculating log returns with rt = log(Pt)− log(Pt−1). Next, we take
squared returns of five-minute intraday data and sum them up to find daily realised
variances as
RVt =
N∑
i=1
r2t
All else remaining constant, SVD is the historic decomposition presented earlier
SV Dt+j =
j−1∑
i=0
IRFi  γt+j−i +
∞∑
i=j
IRFi  γt+j−i
To identify contagion in the holistic associated network from volatility of common
factors localised to a given market we simply take the spread between SVD and
MHD.
Spreadt+j = SV Dt+j −MHDt+j.
4 Data
The data are daily dollar denominated stock returns from 30 developed and devel-
oping countries’ markets across Asia–Pacific, Europe, the Americas and the Middle
East. 4 The beginning of the sample corresponds to the Asian financial crisis period.
Daily returns are generated from price indices for 1 January, 1998 to 15 September,
2017. Global economies endure 10 major crisis periods and several minor turmoils
within the sample periods as outlined in Table 3. Further, we include the West
Texas Intermediate index to investigate shocks coming from the oil market and S&P
GSCI commodity index to investigate the effect of commodity inclusion.
Taking natural logarithms of the data we transform price to returns data. We
further use a two-day moving average filter, removing time zone effects as in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002).
Discussions concerning properties of asset returns dominate in both the current
and early literature. Among early studies, Fama (1976) suggested that daily asset
4The data are sourced from Thompson Reuters, and we follow the mnemonics indexed in (Pukthuanthong and
Roll, 2009).
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returns series are more non-Gaussian than are shorter frequency return series. Ad-
ditionally, Cont (2001) emphasized persistence and non-linearity, while Sta˘rica˘ and
Granger (2005) focused more on non-stationarity inherent within stock returns data.
Recently, Joseph et al. (2017) classified stock returns as non-Gaussian and time
varying, with smooth compact support over low-frequency spectral content. Others
suggested that the daily stock returns data are negatively skewed, nonlinear, noisy
and volatile (Joseph and Larrain, 2008; Atsalakis and Valavanis, 2009; Joseph et al.,
2011; Kremer and Scha¨fer, 2016; Zhong and Enke, 2017). It is crucial to use ap-
propriate filtering and transforming techniques for better detection and decoding of
cycles in source data.
Of the relevant studies examining prediction, Zhou et al. (2012) supported on the
dissent in theory and practice regarding asset returns. Only the pre-possessing of
returns circumvents such misalignment, as suggested by Joseph et al. (2017, 2016);
Atsalakis and Valavanis (2009) and Zhong and Enke (2017). A central context of
data pre-processing with filtering is, there is no discord in its importance in the
relevant studies investigating returns (Joseph et al., 2017).
Finally, Smith et al. (1997) suggested that despite its simplicity as a method,
moving average filters do much better compared to other digital signal processing
techniques, such as single pole. Precisely, moving average handles discrete time series
in a subtle manner (Smith et al., 1997).
Within the context of considering raw returns as non-Gaussian, nonlinear, time-
variant random data, the importance of spectrum density/frequency domain analysis
for pre-processing is undeniable. Hence, moving average is the chosen signal process-
ing technique here. On another note, ‘spectral windowing’ is important to extract
detectable edges and avoid aberrations caused from discontinuity in the raw data.
Naturally, the chosen window size is 2 in our paper, which is consistent with (Op-
penheim and Schafer, 2014) and (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
The transform function
a (1) y (n) = b (1)x (n) + b (2)x (n− 1) + ...+ b (nb + 1)x (η − ηb)
−a (2) y (n− 1)− . . .− a (ηb + 1) y (η − ηa)
handles both infinite and finite impulse responses. The moving average filter derived
from the rational transfer function allows input of different window size (ws) y (n) =
1
ωs
(x (n) + x (n− 1) + . . .+ x (n− (ωs− 1))) .
Indeed, our pre-processed data characterised by the frequency contents of the
signals, better detects the periodicity than does the raw unprocessed returns data.
Table 5 presents a selection of statistics for the 30 return indices; including average,
minimum, maximum, standard deviation and Jarque-Bera test results for normal-
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ity in distribution. The greatest spread between minimum and maximum is found
for Venezuela, Kuwait and Iraq, all of which have high standard deviations. As is
usual for returns normality is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. Rather,
these indices have more leptokurtic and skewed distributions, consistent with the
crisis effects throughout the sample period (Brown and Warner, 1985; Fama and
French, 1988; Kim et al., 1991; Corhay and Rad, 1994; Longin, 1996). In addition
to robustness tests with different rolling windows, we have examined the possibility
of multicollinearity in residuals. We found correlation coefficients to be null and
insignificant in the residuals, ruling out the possibility of loss of consistency in our
estimation outputs.
In the following section, we present a comparison in the estimates gauged from
DY, MHD and SVD. Note that, while DY and MHD estimates are computed drawing
on data from the complete sample size, the MHD-SVD spread draws on from 5
minute interval prices for September 2009 until September 2017. Due to the limited
availability of five-minute interval prices for important South Asian countries, such
as Singapore, we trim the data down to fit vector sub-spaces within the specified
matrix space, for all other vectors retaining Singapore. For similar reasons, we also
remove Middle Eastern markets. We include Mexico in the sample, as it represent
an important, emerging oil exporting market.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we discuss the empirical results presented in Table 1 and Table 2
and Figures 1 to 26. A detailed explanation of the amplifying and dampening of
transmissions and vulnerability is also presented in Table 1 and Table 2.
The analysis holds for two fundamental principles.
1. First, a common phenomenon that largely holds is that big transmitters are
generally more susceptible to global contagion shocks, and that propagation of
crisis with contagion is one-directional.
2. Second, in identifying contagion from an aggregate risk assessment, our eco-
nomic prior is that for the markets in which locally induced volatility swings
together with spillover, the increases coming from interconnection amplify the
aggregate risk estimates, which reverts the market to a steady state by releasing
excess risks onto others. Hence, in times of excess volatility, markets are more
epidemic in nature.
Next, we discuss comparisons by market blocks (see Table 4): Asian crisis (AC),
export crisis (EC), Greek crisis (GC), oil exporting developed (OED) and oil export
emerging (OEE).
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Table 1 and Table 2 show that India, Singapore and Thailand in the AC cluster
are highly susceptible to their own market shocks, but this holds less so for Malaysia,
South Korea and the Philippines. While many past studies have contended (includ-
ing our DY estimates) that Malaysia and the Philippines are more resilient for not
being deeply connected to global networks as others (Raghavan and Dungey, 2015),
our MHD estimates further suggest the latter set of markets receive strong shocks in
major events. As given in Figure 1, Figure 6, Figure 11, Figure 16, Figure 21, Fig-
ure 26, and Table 1, Table 2, we suggest that the Indian, Malaysian and South
Korean markets are more vulnerable to globally induced contagion than are the rest.
The transmission estimates uphold this phenomenon by depicting these markets as
low transmitters that are highly vulnerable to an epidemic in the holistic network. As
Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines remain more susceptible to local volatility,
unsurprisingly they emerge as strong transmitters as they release ‘excess volatility’
to other peripheries (see Table 1 and Table 2). This ‘excess volatility’ refers to the
accumulation of instantaneous self-exciting stochastic volatility in excess of volatility
spillovers coming from the networks itself.
Simultaneous volatility changes in common factors with large scale events often
pollute the degree of actual spillovers as suggested in (Dungey and Renault, 2018).
In the tables (Table 1, Table 2) and the figures (Figure 2, Figure 7, Figure 12, Fig-
ure 17, Figure 22, Figure 26), we identify risks generated out of interconnections
in the network from localised volatility changes for the EC (i.e., Germany, Chile,
France, China, the UK and Australia) market cluster with MHD-SVD spread. We
identify that Germany, Chile and the UK are predominantly more vulnerable to
instantaneous transitory spikes in volatility, polluting the actual degree of shocks
received from interconnections within the network. Consistent with the principle of
high spreaders being less susceptible to vulnerability coming from a global contagion,
the UK and France turn out to be high transmitters of crisis, especially during the
GFC and eurozone crisis. For Australia, transmissions are triggered strongly with
‘excess volatility’ and, as such, it is highly vulnerable to epidemic shocks in the net-
work. As opposed to Dungey and Renault (2018), who suggested Germany does not
suffer from the same market reassessment risk as major markets and is distanced
from other connections, we find Germany and China are highly susceptible to crisis
received from other markets with ‘excess volatility’ most recently. Consequently,
this indicates the degree of systemic risk found within these markets is due to con-
tagion. At the onset of the Chinese and export crises, the heightened volatility in
the German and Chinese market starts spilling excess risks onto others, resulting in
amplified transmission in the network as laid out in the second principle.
In comparing DY and MHD, we find MHD rejects DY’s depictions of Germany
and France as the highest spreaders of crisis. Despite occasional spikes in resilience
responding to major global events spanning our sampling periods, Germany remains
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more vulnerable to crisis coming from contagion than does France or the UK. While
we may attribute the degree of transmissions coming from France as neutral to
dampening, the UK is largely a spreader with strong resilience to contagion.
Table 1, Table 2 and Figure 3, Figure 8, Figure 13, Figure 18, Figure 23, and
Figure 26 depict that the GC countries’ (i.e., Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium,
Croatia and Austria) markets are very sensitive to events contributing to global
contagion. These markets are less characterised by local shocks and the shocks
generated in the neighbouring nodes, except for Greece and Belgium. However, the
MHD measure selects Greece and Austria as becoming more resilient as the eurozone
crisis subsides, while Portugal and Ireland becomes more vulnerable. This can be
attributed to investments moving out of Greece and Belgium and into Portugal
and Ireland, making the latter deeply connected. Moreover, MHD captures Croatia
remaining strongly resilient to shocks across the periods spanning our sample, which
DY fails to detect.
Our transmission estimates for GC countries and the transmission vulnerability
mechanism are in line with what we provided in the first principle. As Portugal
becomes more vulnerable to global contagion more recently, it is of no surprise to
find that Portugal and Ireland transmit stronger shocks in the past. This suggests
Portugal and Ireland remain deeply connected with the other peripheries since before
the GFC. Moreover, with dropping vulnerability coupled with ‘excess volatility’,
Croatia emerges as a strong transmitter during the eurozone crisis.
Figure 26 shows the volatility jumps unique to Greece and Ireland, in which
the excess vulnerability also sets off network transmissions to other markets. In
contrast, transmissions emerging from Portugal and Austria that corresponds to
excess vulnerability is coming from volatility and, hence, is short-lived. Notably,
there is little risk of spillover over-identification for Belgium and Croatia.
Table 1, Table 2 and Figure 4, Figure 9, Figure 14, Figure 19, Figure 24, and
Figure 26 concerning OED countries’ (i.e., the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, Japan
and New Zealand ) markets depicts that stochastic local volatility predominantly
affects the vulnerabilities of the USA, Norway and Mexico. In fact, the recent degree
of risks stemming from the USA and Russia is emanating mostly from ‘excess volatil-
ity’. In contrast, exceeding return spillovers following the onset of export crisis for
Norway, Japan and New Zealand suggests these markets are especially contagious.
The spread falls for Canada and, very recently, for Mexico, suggesting the spillovers
in these markets are driven less by local volatility and more by their dominance in
the holistic network.
Taking a more granular view with our MHD and DY comparison, the Japanese
and New Zealand transmissions provide further reassurance as to the nature of these
markets’ vulnerabilities. Japanese volatility transmission is depicted as contagion
transmission, which corresponds with Japan emerging as a highly connected market
17
out of its long-lasting economic stagnation in early 2000. Neutral to dampening
volatility transmissions stemming from the USA, but also a curving up of its trans-
mission swings with a shifting regime, gives credence to BIS (1998) suggestion that
both the USA and Japan are ‘conduits’ for contagion transmission. Conversely, the
upheavals in the global oil market influence the nature of New Zealand’s contagion,
more so than for other global events.
Comparing DY and MHD estimates we further find that, the USA and Japan
are more susceptible to contagion risk transmissions than to the degree of risks they
transmit themselves. The exaggeration of risk susceptibility is overlain with risks
transpiring within, especially for the USA and Japan. Moreover, dismissing what is
gauged from DY estimates regarding Russia, MHD substantiates Russian resilience
spanning across the entire sample period. Additionally, Russian transmissions pick
up in all major events. To a much lesser extent, this holds true for Norway as well.
Finally, turning to OEE countries’ (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, Nige-
ria and Venezuela) markets, we conjecture these markets are not at all contagious
by examining Table 1, Table 2 and Figure 5, Figure 10, Figure 15, Figure 20, Fig-
ure 25, Figure 26. Although the countries in this cluster dominate the global oil
market, an upheaval in the oil market increases market strength in these markets.
Consequently, they demonstrate strong resilience in phases of price or supply shocks
in the oil market.
In several occasions for the OEE cluster, DY estimates fail to produce convincing
evidence that aligns with MHD. DY fails to capture the amplifications in vulnera-
bility for Saudi Arabia corresponding to the advent of the GFC and the diminishing
systemic risks emitting from Iraq. MHD captures this successfully. Further, more re-
cently, DY fails to capture the increases in vulnerability for Venezuela, which is more
sensible given the heightening of the Venezuelan economic crisis, but is depicted in
the MHD curves. With MHD, we disentangle the spikes in volatility transmissions
for Kuwait, which naturally responds to the Iraq invasion and oil supply shock. In
both cases, confidence build-up occurs dramatically in the Kuwait market. Again,
DY fails to capture the dampening of Nigerian systemic risk transmission with the oil
price crash following the Iraq invasion. On balance, we sufficiently provide evidence
of MHD better capturing larger effects on the economy than DY.
5.1 Identifying contagion
A key contribution of the current paper is ‘contagion’ identification in the pool
of markets from interconnection, for which crisis demarcation is not a necessary
condition. While all interconnections and amplifications in the systemic risk that
is found within this sample markets do not lead to contagion, contagion poses the
unique threat of a financial pandemic. Hence, contagion is a necessary condition for
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a widespread crisis to ensue. We propose a tractable and simple technique to identify
contagious markets while the condition remains dynamic. Thus, a key question at
this stage is, ‘How diabolic is a contagious market today compared to the past?’ In
other words, are we going to experience a global meltdown similar to that of the
GFC if a crisis is triggered from a contagious market?
From Figure 26, we separate out Singapore, China, Australia and Japan as more
contagious markets than the rest, especially in more recent times. Despite observing
that the 2016 Chinese stock market crash sends shocks tumbling globally, the carnage
is not as pronounced as in the GFC.
The models presented here shows that the Chinese stock market crash unfolding
in January 2016 sets off a global rout, dragging down the stocks across the USA,
Germany and rest of Europe and Brazil to 2 to 3 per cent. Chinese economic growth
plunges to 25-year low. Leading up to this, speculations and warnings reflected en-
gendered fears of a global meltdown, including warnings issued by the International
Monetary Fund (Mauldin, 2017; Liang, 2016; Mao, 2009; Elliott, 2017; Cheng, 2017).
The Chinese authority responded by imposing new trading curbs and devaluing cur-
rency. While commentators, including the China Securities Regulatory Commission
blamed surging speculation and irrational investment behaviour for sourcing the cri-
sis, Mao (2009)suggested that the colossal shadow banking industry was responsible
for heightening the risks in the Chinese markets much earlier. Presumably, potential
risks are predominant in the shadow banks in China, which have quadrupled at an
annual rate of 34 per cent since 2008, and at that time the size of the Chinese shadow
banks (US $8 trillion) is equal to 4.3 per cent of Chinese GDP (Mao, 2009). Liang
(2016) asserted that the burgeoning shadow economy, amidst the goal of boosting
productivity against an overall drop in the labour market, posed a high risk to the
financial stability of China given its current regulatory framework.
We do not experience a replay of the 2008 GFC. Recently, Dungey et al. (2020)
provided evidence of no new systemic crises emerging from China to other global
markets given the resurgence in systemic risk. While our study purports to identify
sources of crisis, the case for China is particularly interesting. Generally, the results
capture a unique case of shadow banking and securitisation. There is a plethora of
studies showing bank securitisation leads to higher systemic risks, while increasing
bank profitability and ensuring a buffer of liquidity for the bank (Adrian and Shin,
2009; Uhde and Michalak, 2010; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Nadauld and Weisbach,
2012; Georg, 2013; Battaglia et al., 2014; Bakoush et al., 2019). Although securiti-
sation allows banks to shed their own idiosyncratic risks into financial markets and
confirms a buffer of liquid assets coupled with higher profitability, a vicious cycle
forms as banks’ exposure to credit risk intensifies. The shadow banking industry is
evolving to retain risks while pursuing regulatory arbitrage by means of retaining
rollover risks pertaining to maturity mismatch. These pose a significant threat for
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the sponsors assuming these risks. In effect, conduits are attributed with systemic
risk involving commercial banks, insurance institutions and equity market compo-
nents. This also explains the USA or other advanced markets posing no significantly
new threat in recent times, partly because the post-2008 credit crisis saw several
restrictions imposed on banking securitisation, particularly in advanced economies.
The Association for Financial Markets in Europe (2017) reported a significant reduc-
tion in securitisation activities within 10 years, especially for the USA and European
banks. Evidently, this has impaired the capital and profitability of these banks, as
suggested by the Bank for International Settlement (2018).
Moreover, we do not observe a re-emergence of global meltdown from China or
other contagious markets because of the structural differences between cross-border
capital diffusion to what was occurring with the USA during the GFC. Shirai and
Sugandi (2018) reported that Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore are the major fi-
nanciers of cross-border capital in the Asia–Pacific economies. While Singapore
has the largest financial centres and is also the largest equity investor to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and others in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan invests largely in Australian debt
securities. Conversely, Hong Kong invests mostly in the equities issued by the PRC.
Issuing US$3.5 trillion cross-border portfolio assets, Japan’s exposure to the Asia–
Pacific region is mostly through Australia (US$572 billion), and vice versa. Despite
this, the Asian Bond Funds administered and managed by banks for international
settlement exclude Australia, Japan and New Zealand. The Asian Bond Funds
ABF1 and ABF2 were introduced to develop the sovereign and quasi-sovereign bond
markets dominated by the USA dollar and local markets, respectively. However,
these countries are the main pathway for the USA and EU to invest in the region.
Hence, 60 per cent of the total shares issued in the USA and EU forms the cross-
border portfolio for Japan, Australia and the ROK in the region establishing a strong
bridge between the continents. Singapore is the largest investor in shares issued by
the USA and EU. While the cross-border portfolio assets of Hong Kong, China, sum
up to US$1.1 trillion, its portfolio shares mostly concentrate on the PRC (50 per
cent) followed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-5 (37 per cent). The
USA and EU shares constitute only 24 per cent of the cross-border portfolio trading
in Hong Kong, China. Hong Kong invests US$404 billion in the PRC-issued shares,
compared with US$235 billion by Japan and US$218 billion by Singapore. Hong
Kong has only US$99 billion invested in USA assets and US$165 billion invested
in EU assets. In contrast, Australian foreign assets include 42 per cent USA-issued
securities, with only 26 per cent from the EU (Shirai and Sugandi, 2018).
In terms of cross-border portfolio liabilities, 73 per cent of Japan’s total cross-
border portfolio liabilities (US$1.7 trillion) are financed by the USA and EU, while
the USA and EU finances 33 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively, of total liabilities
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of Australia (US$966 billion). Interestingly, while the USA and EU finances 66 per
cent of the total cross-border portfolio liabilities of Hong Kong (US$390 billion), Hong
Kong finances 42 per cent of the total liabilities of the PRC (US$710 billion). As a net
debtor of cross-border portfolio investments to the world, Australia remains highly
exposed to the USA and EU, which account for over 70 per cent. Since 2001, For
Japan, Australia also remains its biggest investment destination, increasing investing
into Australia by four times (US$118 billion) in the post-GFC. The foreign portfolio
asset and liabilities of Hong Kong and Singapore exceed that of Japan in the post-
GFC, and for Hong Kong these grow by 157 per cent and 142 per cent, respectively
(Shirai and Sugandi, 2018).
In summary, as highly contagious markets, Japan and Singapore are not causing
widespread crisis, as no crisis is revealed in these markets, or in the USA or EU in
more recent times. In fact, the restrictions applied in the USA securitisation induce
calmness in these markets. Hence, we are also observing calmness in the Australian
markets. However, given the degree of exposure to each other and connectivity be-
tween these markets, a large enough shock in any of these markets may destabilise
the other. In contrast, Hong Kong, China, concentrates investments mostly in the
PRC. As both the economies are part of the PRC, this creates a closed-circuit trans-
mitting wealth within. This is also a reason why the 2016 crash was absorbed mostly
within the circuit and did not turn diabolical, despite having all the potential. In
fact, this allows the central Chinese authorities to apply new restrictions, such as
short selling bans or bans on stock investments as appeared in 2015, without inciting
a global response.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have identified contagious and more volatile markets relying on
time-varying systemic risk in an associated network of markets. We began by ex-
ploring the transmission of risks and vulnerability to risks spanning across the sample
period of nearly 20 years with unsigned return measures (DY), a well-known method
proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Next, we estimated return spillovers with
signed spillover measures computed with MHD proposed recently by Dungey et al.
(2018b), and concluded that signed spillover measures capture all or more informa-
tion than unsigned spillover measures. Third, we estimated signed volatility trans-
missions and vulnerabilities computing from MHD, and drew on realised variances
from five-minute intraday returns. Finally, we plotted the differences between time-
varying volatility and return spillover estimates, which showed the markets that
are epidemic in the complex network structure and the markets that are endemic
in nature but predominantly volatile with a higher core volatility. Hence, we have
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addressed the issue of over-identification in the degree of systemic risk, which the
markets emit in calm and crisis periods
We found that mis-identification of contagion issues is prevalent when explaining
risk transmissions and the build-up of market resilience across time with the unsigned
spillover method only. We addressed these issues by re-estimating systemic risks with
MHD. In the absolute representation of time-varying unsigned spillover measure, we
found that unsigned spillover overestimates the level of actual resilience building for
South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Germany, China and Israel. This measure
also overestimates the degree of risk transmissions coming from Iraq, Venezuela, the
USA (prior to the GFC) and, more recently, Nigeria and Greece. While the DY un-
derestimates Greek, Croatian and Russian resilience building in recent years, it also
underestimates the risks emanating from Kuwait, South Korea and Germany. Severe
changes in market micro-structure corresponding to profound economic degradation
is rather misrepresented as resilience building with DY for its absolute representation
of spillovers. We found this holds for both Iraq and Venezuela. The signed spillover
estimates captures the convergence in the swings of systemic risks as the economies
in both the countries collapse.
We provided evidence of a crucial phenomenon as we separated out the influence
of stochastic local volatility as opposed to the actual degree of systemic risks found
within a market. First, a market is not likely to be transmitting shocks and remain
vulnerable at the same time. Moreover, during high-risk transmissions, markets
turn more resilient or vice versa. However, it is more likely that high transmissions
lead to a phenomenal increase in vulnerability for the market to negative in-shocks
transpiring within the network. Second, in the amplification of total risk generation
with the accumulation of self-exciting intraday local volatility added to systemic
risks coming from the network, markets respond by casting off ‘excess volatility’
onto others. In other words, it is likely that a highly volatile market gives strong
episodes of risk transmission at the start of an event without becoming an epidemic
market. Nevertheless, such spikes may accompany a fall in the local market, as
outlined in Bates et al. (2019).
Complementing the work of Dungey and Renault (2018), our technique identified
the degree of systemic risks free of simultaneous volatility increases accompanying a
rise in volatility in common factors, and may have various contributions to the field
of economics and machine learning. First, it may enable managers of risk to better
rebalance portfolios, parsing information concerning epidemic and non-epidemic el-
ements in the portfolio. Supervisors may find it useful to understand risks coming
with big links, and to target issues amplifying risks. Machine-learning enthusiasts
may find it interesting to feed forward networks of markets scaled with proper degrees
of systemic risk indices. Further, Bayesian priors can be generated weighted with
amplifications and dampening in signed risk estimates, and predictability of mar-
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ket risks can be improved. In all, the methods combined not only serve a purpose
by producing comparisons, but produces better information regarding a market’s
susceptibility to realised crashes and volatility evolution.
We attempted to explore complex market associations spanning across the last two
decades, encapsulating major global events across many markets. The markets were
selected to represent dynamic shifts that each subsequent event provides and were
then grouped into a closed system. As with the precursors of systemic risk studies,
limitations arose from the limited intraday data availability for the Middle Eastern
markets. However, we substituted with additional markets that depicted a similar
pattern. Alternatively, a target should be an investor sentiment analysis correspond-
ing to risk patterns, leading to a better understanding of strong amplifications in
risk propagation.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Figures
Figure 1: DY: Transmission - Asian crisis markets
Note: This figure represents the transmission of systemic risk from the Asian crisis markets to all
others, derived from the DY conditional variance index.
Figure 2: DY: Transmission - export crisis markets
Note: This figure represents transmission of systemic risk from Export Crisis markets to all others,
derived from DY conditional variance index.
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Figure 3: DY: Transmission - Greek crisis markets
Note: This figure represents the transmission of systemic risk from the Greek crisis markets to all
others, derived from the DY conditional variance index.
Figure 4: DY: Transmission - oil exporting emerging markets
Note: This figure represents the transmission of systemic risk from major oil exporting emerging
countries’ markets to all others, derived from the DY conditional variance index.
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Figure 5: DY: Transmission - Oil exporting developed markets
Note: This figure represents the transmission of systemic risk from major oil exporting developed
countries’ markets to all others, derived from the DY conditional variance index.
Figure 6: DY: Vulnerability - Asian crisis markets
Note: This figure represents the vulnerability of Asian crisis countries’ markets to systemic risk
transmitted from other markets to own markets , derived from the DY conditional variance analysis.
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Figure 7: DY: Vulnerability - export crisis markets
Note: This figure represents the vulnerability of export crisis countries’ markets to systemic risk
transmitted from other markets to own markets , derived from the DY conditional variance analysis.
Figure 8: DY: Vulnerability - Greek crisis markets
Note: This figure represents the vulnerability of Greek crisis countries’ markets to systemic risk
transmitted from other markets to own markets , derived from the DY conditional variance analysis.
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Figure 9: DY: Vulnerability - oil exporting developed countries’ markets
Note: This figure represents the vulnerability of major oil Exporting developed countries’ markets
to systemic risk transmitted from other markets to own markets , derived from the DY conditional
variance analysis.
Figure 10: DY: Vulnerability - oil exporting emerging countries’ markets
Note: This figure represents the vulnerability of major oil Exporting emerging countries’ markets
to systemic risk transmitted from other markets to own markets, derived from the DY conditional
variance analysis.
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Figure 11: MHD: Asian crisis markets
Note: This figure shows the signed spillover indices of both the transmission and vulnerability of
Asian crisis countries’ markets, to and from all other markets, respectively.
Figure 12: MHD: export crisis markets
Note: This figure shows the signed spillover indices of both the transmission and vulnerability of
export crisis countries’ markets, to and from all other markets, respectively.
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Figure 13: MHD: Greek crisis markets
Note: This figure shows the signed spillover indices of both the transmission and vulnerability of
Greek crisis countries’ markets, to and from all other markets, respectively.
Figure 14: MHD: oil exporting developed countries markets
Note: This figure shows the signed spillover indices of both the transmission and vulnerability of
oil exporting developed countries’ markets, to and from all other markets, respectively.
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Figure 15: MHD: oil exporting emerging countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the signed spillover indices of both the transmission and vulnerability of
oil exporting emerging countries’ markets, to and from all other markets, respectively.
Figure 16: MHD and SVD vulnerabilities: Asian crisis market
Note: This figure shows the signs of in-shocks sourced from the Asian crisis countries’ markets to
targets listed in the AC cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility index .
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Figure 17: MHD and SVD vulnerabilities: export crisis Market
Note: This figure shows the signs of in-shocks sourced from export crisis countries’ markets targets
listed in the EC cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility index.
Figure 18: MHD and SVD vulnerabilities: Greek crisis market
Note: This figure shows the signs of in-shocks sourced from Greek crisis countries’ markets targets
listed in the GC cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility index .
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Figure 19: MHD and SVD vulnerabilities: oil exporting developed countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the signs of in-shocks sourced from oil exporting developed countries’
markets targets listed in the OED cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility
index .
Figure 20: MHD and SVD vulnerabilities: oil exporting emerging countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the signs of in-shocks sourced from oil exporting emerging countries’
markets targets listed in the OEE cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility
index .
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Figure 21: MHD and SVD transmission: Asian crisis countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the effects of out-shocks sourced from Asian crisis countries’ markets to
recipients listed in the AC cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility index .
Figure 22: MHD and SVD transmission: export crisis countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the effects of out-shocks sourced from Export crisis countries’ markets to
recipients listed in the EC cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility index .
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Figure 23: MHD and SVD transmission: Greek crisis countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the effects of out-shocks sourced from Greek crisis countries’ markets to
recipients listed in the GC cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed volatility index .
Figure 24: MHD and SVD transmission: oil exporting developed countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the effects of out-shocks sourced from oil exporting developed countries’
markets to the recipients listed in OED cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed
volatility index .
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Figure 25: MHD and SVD transmission: oil exporting emerging countries’ markets
Note: This figure shows the effects of out-shocks sourced from oil Exporting emerging countries’
markets to recipients listed in the OEE cluster gauged in signed spillover index and the signed
volatility index .
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Figure 26: The SVD-MHD spread: This SVD-MHD spread figure focuses out contagious markets from non-contagious markets by drawing on estimated
differences between the MHD and SVD gauges.
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Table 1: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Vulnerability
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
AC 1. India, Malaysia and Thailand show
consistently slow increase in vulnerability
across the years.
2. We see dramatic resilience building for
Singapore, South Korea and the Philip-
pines, corresponding to that of the USA
with the arrival of the Iraq invasion while
the USA recovery from dotcom bubble also
remains a more conspicuous factor. The
general buoyance in the Asian markets res-
onates with the recoupling in the USA
market coupled with expectations soaring
with the invasion. Soon after, vulnera-
bility starts rising for the aforementioned
countries’ markets.
1. India, Malaysia and Thailand show
lasting resilience across the years spanned
by our sample, except for pronounced rises
only for India and Thailand in the GFC.
Moreover, sheer resilience for India is de-
picted in Figure 6 in the period follow-
ing the GFC. Among others, Thailand
remains somewhat vulnerable, with little
spikes in vulnerability corresponding to
major events such as the GFC and euro-
zone crisis.
2. In contrast to the findings with DY,
we do not see resilience building up dra-
matically for South Korea, the Philippines
and Singapore. Indeed, profound ampli-
fications and dampening are depicted in
the South Korean and Philippines mar-
kets, adding up to what seems like big
jumps in the absolute representation of
DY. Rather, we find vulnerability to be
the more conspicuous factor attributable
to South Korea and the Philippines mar-
kets. Attributed with a high degree of sys-
temic risk, both these markets’ vulnera-
bilities amplify in response to almost all
the major events presented in our sample
period. Despite remaining mostly vulner-
able, the degree of vulnerability and re-
silience reverts to the mean degree for Sin-
gapore following the post-Asian financial
crisis period.
Coming to the identification of small
contemporaneous shocks spawning from
volatility characteristics of a market, out
of mutually reinforcing long-lived corre-
lations, we find India, Singapore and
the Philippines are predominantly volatile.
Strong inter-temporal volatility contribut-
ing mostly to vulnerability predominates
for India, Singapore and the Philippines.
While sheer resilience for the Philippines
during the eurozone crisis is depicted in
Figure 16, this cannot be held true for
the others. However, vulnerability for
Malaysia, Thailand and, more recently, for
South Korea is coming from far less volatil-
ity than are Singapore and the Philippines.
This suggests that the former countries
are more susceptible to international con-
tagion than to local shocks.
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Vulnerability
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
EC 1. A strong resilience building up for Ger-
many in late 2002 is consistent with the
USA, Singapore, South Korea and Japan.
This period marks the recovery of the
USA and Japanese markets from economic
downturns. This period also marks the ad-
vent of the Iraq invasion, which rekindled
confidence in the energy stocks. For Ger-
many, the sheer resilience is followed by
a pronounced drop following the Iraq in-
vasion. Aggregate vulnerability increases
with exogenous shocks coming from oil
and commodity indices. This observation
holds true for other EC markets such as
the UK, France, Chile and China. Aus-
tralian resilience starts to pick up in the
Iraq Invasion period. Predominantly a
major exporter of energy resources, Aus-
tralian resilience build-up can arguably be
attributable to the tightening of oil sup-
ply from the OPEC countries following the
Iraq invasion, boosting confidence in Aus-
tralian commodities market.
2. Germany, the UK and France are con-
ceivable as potent crisis spreaders as the
eurozone crisis unfolds. Consequently,
they show strong resilience build-up dur-
ing the same period. Among others, with
the announcement of Brexit, the UK sees
resilience picking up again. Resilience also
picks up strongly for China as the market
recovers, followed by a strong recoupling
phase.
3. Chile remains vulnerable, with vulner-
ability accelerating more in recent periods
corresponding to oil and commodity inclu-
sion, than previously.
1. Resilience amplifications are mounting
for Germany with DY, but less so with
MHD. However, unlike DY, MHD captures
the German market remaining vulnerable
across most of the sample period, with oc-
casional resilience build-up phases around
the GFC and eurozone crisis. Hence, more
phases of resilience are identifiable with
MHD for Germany. Similar observations
accord well with the France vulnerability
pattern. The UK market remains strongly
resilient, spanning across the entire sample
period. In accordance with DY findings,
the MHD plot for the UK in Figure 12 de-
picts strong resilience in the post-GFC and
during the eurozone crisis. While remain-
ing a strong spreader and being suscepti-
ble to shocks during the GFC as held by
the global literature, it is indeed promising
that the degree of rebounding in the UK
market complements recoupling.
2. Chinese market remains largely vulner-
able as depicted in Figure 12. A short-
lived resilience during the recent Russian
crisis is followed only by more periods
of vulnerability for China, with the on-
set of the Chinese stock market crash.
MHD finds Chinese vulnerability is re-
peated across major global events, provid-
ing a better rationalisation for the Chinese
market mechanism than for DY. Mostly,
DY could not detect the cycles of ampli-
fication and dampening corresponding to
many past events.
3. Similar to the DY vulnerability pat-
tern for Australia, MHD also suggests
Australia remains vulnerable in the years
spanned by our sample. This holds true
also for Chile.
Contemporaneous small shocks that builds
up temporal interdependence correspond-
ing to unprecedented local events rather
than long-term interdependence is preva-
lent in Germany, Chile and France. In
other words, the market vulnerabilities of
Germany, Chile and the UK are less deter-
mined by contagion as outlined in the work
of Dungey and Renault (2018). More-
over, we concur with Dungey and Renault
(2018) in regards to Germany not suffer-
ing from the same market reassessment of
default risk as the others. Such can be
also be held true for France. Although
we find strong volatility spikes contribut-
ing to aggregate vulnerability for Ger-
many and China during the eurozone cri-
sis and for the UK in the export crisis
(see Table 4), return spillovers prevailing
for France, Australia and China since the
export crisis indicate that these markets’
degree of susceptibility increases with con-
tagion within the network itself. There-
fore, little decoupling can be expected for
these markets and as an economic prior
only strong shifts in the network structure
may drift the markets away from their cur-
rent degree of impulses into vulnerability.
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Vulnerability
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
GC 1. Greece, Portugal and Austria remain
highly vulnerable across the sample pe-
riod. Market resilience starts to pick up
slowly in the post-GFC period. Figure 8
depicts an increase in resilience for the
Austrian market that coincides with com-
mencement of Greek’s new austerity mea-
sures. Resilience starts to build in the peri-
ods that follow for Greece and Portugal up
until the new austerity measure is adopted
as the eurozone crisis slows down. Vul-
nerability amplifies for Greece and Portu-
gal with new Greek austerity measures in
place. We conjecture from DY that Greece
is more at the receiving end of shocks
from its peripheries than transmitting the
shocks to others.
2. Gyrations in the vulnerability of Croa-
tia is more pronounced than for Ireland
and Belgium. While the amplification
in vulnerability levels off for Ireland and
Belgium, as the eurozone crisis becomes
full-fledged, the Croatian pattern remains
volatile. Facing the dampening of exports,
vulnerability for Belgium and Croatia am-
plifies. .
1. Preceded by a strong amplification in
vulnerability facing the eurozone crisis, the
Austrian market’s vulnerability begins to
drop with Greece adopting new austerity
measures. The Austrian pattern resonates
well with DY, and also holds for Portugal.
Moreover, MHD captures that in the most
recent periods, with the eurozone crisis
subsiding, Greek resilience building accel-
erates, while vulnerability dominates the
risk curve of Portugal.
2. MHD provides better information con-
cerning Croatian swings in the systemic
risks compared to DY. In contrast with the
information produced with DY, MHD sup-
ports that Croatian systemic risk swings
lie well within the boundary outside the
vulnerability region. Croatian market re-
mains rather resilient to shocks across the
sample periods. As opposed to the DY
pattern, the Belgium systemic risk pat-
tern depicts rapid deceleration in vulnera-
bility, moving the curve towards neutrality
in the post-GFC period, and also holds for
Ireland. Albeit smaller spikes in vulnera-
bility are discernible for Belgium and Ire-
land during the eurozone crisis compared
to the spikes observable during the GFC,
the markets are becoming more resilient.
1. 1. Contemporaneous small surges in
volatility due to shocks inherent to local
factors have little effect on the GC mar-
kets, except for very recently. This sug-
gests contagion influences the GC markets
since the onset of the eurozone crisis. Dur-
ing the eurozone crisis and with the phases
of Greek austerity measures, Figure 18
shows that positive in-shocks from return
spillovers for Portugal, Ireland, Croatia,
Austria, Belgium and, especially, Greece
far exceeds any localised volatility risk.
2. In the period following the eurozone
crisis, Portugal, Greece and Ireland be-
come more susceptible to volatility inter-
connections than to contagion. This indi-
cates that these markets have less risks due
to contemporaneous associations with pe-
ripheries. This does not hold for the vul-
nerability patterns of Belgium and Croa-
tia, and Croatia also remains strongly cor-
related to the peripheries.
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Vulnerability
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
OED As the USA market recovers from deba-
cles following the dotcom bubble and the
Japanese market rebounds from the long-
lasting debt crisis, resilience in both the
markets peaks profoundly. These two ma-
jor economies recover results with simi-
lar outcomes for other deeply connected
markets such as Germany, South Korea
and Singapore. Canada, New Zealand and
Norway’s vulnerabilities slowly grow since
the GFC unfolds. The Canadian curve
shows several episodes of short-term re-
silience building along the way. However,
Canada and New Zealand’s vulnerability
curve shifts up with the inclusion of oil and
commodity indices, but less so for Norway.
The strongest resilience build-up for Rus-
sia is depicted during the USA embargo on
Russia. It emerges that with the embargo,
the limited node connections cast out risks
for Russia.
Consistent with DY, the MHD plots for
the USA and Japan show the strength-
ening of resilience in early 2000. While
vulnerability for the USA and Canada
remains positive all along, Japanese re-
silience peaks correspond to the phases
of confidence building in the markets and
preceded by recovery periods associated
with all major global events. This holds
to a much less extent for Norway, and to
a moderate extent for New Zealand. From
MHD, what re-emerges is that these three
countries’ markets suffer from the same
market assessment of default risk. Unlike
what DY depicts, the Russian market re-
mains resilient for the sample period with
MHD.
Strong local volatility factors casting off
risks are attributable to the USA, Canada,
Russia and Norway in the eurozone crisis.
This is not so for Japan, which highlights
Japanese vulnerability to conditional cor-
relations with the other peripheral markets
as depicted in Figure 19. We find that in
the post-eurozone crisis and with the onset
of export drag, Russia, Norway and Japan
become highly susceptible to contagion fol-
lowed by some degree of decoupling.
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Vulnerability
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
OEE In line with the global literature, Fig-
ure 10 depicts the heightening of resilience
for large exporters of oil such as Saudi Ara-
bia, Iraq and Nigeria. This is explained
global investors’ move towards energy se-
curities and away from MBS in the ad-
vent of GFC. The increasing resilience for
Kuwait and Israel is better explained by
boosted investors’ confidence as the Iraq
invasion is happening. This is due to the
conflict between Iraq and Kuwait and Is-
rael in the regime. However, Venezuelan
resilience building in the most recent pe-
riods can only be attributed to its disen-
tangling of connections, as the whole econ-
omy is at a worsening spiral. The vulnera-
bilities for Israel and Nigeria significantly
increase when adding oil and commodity
shocks to the system.
MHD perfectly captures the resilience
building for Saudi Arabia in DY. How-
ever, what DY fails to capture is the strong
jump in vulnerability that follows. MHD
further captures the neutralising of sys-
temic risks emitting from Iraq. This find-
ing can be better conceived as provid-
ing a better rationalisation for the ces-
sation of Iraqi market activities with the
invasion. Hence, DY is more mislead-
ing for the Iraq case. Despite Kuwait
and Israel’s resilience building given by
both DY and MHD, MHD identifies that
this is not as strong for both the mar-
kets in comparison to what is drawn from
DY. In contrast, DY does not emphasise
the peaks in Israeli vulnerability with the
GFC. With the fall of Iraq, weakening of
OPEC and increasing USA support for Is-
rael in the regime, it is conceivable that
Western investors’ interest in the Israeli
market spikes as barriers drop. This ex-
plains the spike in vulnerability for Israel
during the GFC with the deepening of in-
terconnections with the USA. Conspicu-
ously in the MHD of Venezuela, which is
unlike the results of DY, the economic col-
lapse of Venezuela only fuels its vulnera-
bility in the most recent periods. Nigeria
remains vulnerable across the sample pe-
riod with DY and holds for MHD.
We replace the Middle Eastern markets
with New Zealand and Mexico as major oil
exporting countries. We find the vulnera-
bilities in both these markets are coming
more from contagion and less from local
volatility factors.
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Table 2: Empirical analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Transmission
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
AC 1. Transmission mounts for India, Singa-
pore and Thailand during the GFC.
2. South Korean transmissions amplify
during 2002–2004 when the global econ-
omy was riddled with many crises.
3. The Malaysian and Philippines markets
demonstrate neutral to dampening trans-
missions overall.
4. Inclusion of oil and commodity indices
amplifies transmission during crisis, but
only for India and South Korea.
5. Little amplification in transmission is
observed for all participants facing the
GFC.
1. Patterns accord well with DY results
for India, Singapore and Thailand during
the 2006–2008 GFC period.
2. As opposed to DY depiction, the South
Korean transmission bears a negative sign,
suggesting the dampening of transmission
is dominant during 2002–2004.
3. The Philippines and South Korea por-
tray negative transmissions, the only ex-
ception of which was during the GFC
event. This supports the DY argument.
4. Positive transmissions are plotted for
all markets during the GFC, similar to the
DY observations.
Transmissions in the AC cluster shows In-
dia, Malaysia and the Philippines are be-
coming more epidemic in nature. Strong
volatility amplifications in Thailand and
Singapore suggest transmissions of crisis
from these markets are more endemic in
nature.
EC 1. We find a resurgence in transmission for
Germany during 2002–2004 similar to that
of South Korea mentioned earlier.
2. France and UK transmissions amplify
in the advent of the eurozone crisis, while
remaining neutral in earlier crises.
3. Australian transmissions slightly am-
plify during the GFC and export crisis.
Dampening prevails in the transitions be-
tween crises.
4. Chinese transmissions amplify mostly
with the recent Chinese crisis. Earlier,
Chinese transmissions amplify only during
the GFC.
1. With Germany we again find negative
transmissions across 2002–2004, rejecting
DY depiction. This is similar to South Ko-
rean transmissions mentioned in the earlier
cluster.
2. Consistent with DY, MHD shows posi-
tive transmission across the eurozone crisis
preceded by a negative dampening during
the GFC for both France and the UK.
3. MHD is consistent with DY for Aus-
tralia.
4. The findings are similar to DY.
1. Most in this cluster turn more epi-
demic, especially following the onset of
Eurozone crisis. In contrast, short-lived
volatility rises profoundly for China and
Australia, corresponding to the Chinese
crash.
2. Importantly, the patterns in Figure 22
outline that the transmissions from this
cluster are, on average, epidemic in the
cooling-off period from the eurozone cri-
sis. Soon after, markets revert to being
endemic to varying degrees.
Continued on next page
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Table 2: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Transmission
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
GC 1. Transmissions amplify for Greece, Por-
tugal and Ireland with the eurozone and
Greek crises. Recently, Ireland transmis-
sions ascend following a descend.
2. Belgium shows escalating transmissions
facing the recent export shrinkage.
1. Greek transmission shows small surges
in the positive direction, followed by
strong negative dampening, mostly during
the eurozone. In contradiction to DY, the
strongest surges for Portugal and Ireland
are found during the GFC.
2. Belgium transmissions remain neutral
to dampening. Unlike DY, the positive
and negative estimates offset strong am-
plifications for Belgium.
3. As the Greek crisis unfolds, positive
transmissions resurge for Croatia. This is
not identified with DY.
1. Risk transmissions from this cluster ap-
pear not highly epidemic. Strong volatil-
ity sways simultaneously over Ireland and
Greece following on from when the first
Greek austerity measures are adopted.
2. Figure 23 highlights that in the most
recent periods, Belgium and Austria cast
off some risks at an epidemic level.
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Table 2: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Transmission
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
OED 1. We find the strongest transmissions for
the USA and Japan during the dotcom
bubble. Transmissions resurge during the
GFC and GC for the USA. Japanese trans-
missions decelerate during this period only
to amplify in the post-GC period, possibly
corresponding to global export shrinkage
coupled with oil flat. Crucially, transmis-
sions are reduced with the inclusion of oil
and commodity indices.
2. Russian transmissions amplify in all
major events across the sampling peri-
ods, leading to a phenomenal jump fac-
ing the recent Russian financial crisis of
2014–2015. Inclusion of oil and commodity
indices slightly dampen the transmissions.
3. The transmissions for both Canada and
Norway sharply descend, corresponding to
a dramatic decline in global oil prices im-
mediately after climbing to an apex in the
post-GFC period. For both these markets,
oil and commodity inclusion reduces trans-
mission levels.
4. Gyrations in the transmissions of New
Zealand do not show sharp oscillations.
1. The anticipated ‘conduit effect’ of the
USA and Japan (BIS, 1998), which drives
transmissions up from the USA, Japan to
other countries and is supported in earlier
studies, is dismissed with MHD. We iden-
tify dampening for the USA market dur-
ing the dotcom bubble. Conversely, damp-
ening in transmissions from the Japanese
markets is preceded by a strong amplifi-
cation during the dotcom bubble, suggest-
ing the ‘conduit effect’ may still hold for
Japan. The dampening for Japan is at-
tributable to the debt crisis predominating
during that period.
2. Risk transmission from Russia remains
strongly positive for the most part, with
exceptions only during the advent of the
GFC and Russian crisis of 2014–2015.
3. The patterns accord well with the DY
findings for both Canada and Norway. Ad-
ditionally, the Norwegian market shows
neither a dramatic dampening nor sharp
amplification in its transmissions across
the sample period, and the DY estimates
may have misrepresented the degree of
transmissions for Norway.
4. The transmissions that New Zealand
emit are predominantly near its mean. Ex-
cept for a few spikes following the GFC
and GC, New Zealand transmissions re-
main neutral to other major crises or
volatility shocks.
1. Risk transmission stemming from lo-
cally induced volatility can be attributable
to the USA, Russia, Mexico and Norway,
especially following the recent Russian eco-
nomic crisis and oil supply shock. In con-
trast, Japan, New Zealand and Canada are
passing risks on to others in the network,
without inflicting locally induced volatility
in the process. Hence, we can refer more to
these markets as ’conduits’ than to others
in recent years.
2. In the post-Chinese crisis, Japanese
and New Zealand transmissions might be-
come more pandemic than endemic.
Continued on next page
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Table 2: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Transmission
Blocks DY MHD MHD-SVD
OEE 1. Transmissions peak during the GFC
and export shrinkage for the Saudi Ara-
bian market. Oil inclusion causes an over-
all drop in the transmission curve for this
market.
2. We identify transmissions amplifying
with the onset of Iraq invasion for Israel.
Transmissions from this market resurge
again as the Greek debt crisis rolls into a
full-fledged eurozone crisis.
3. While Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait does
not decelerate the transmissions emitting
from Iraq, this leads to the complete nul-
lification of transmissions from Kuwait. A
substantial amplification of transmission
from Iraq in the ensuing GFC is identified
with DY.
4. Among the non-Middle Eastern OEE
countries’ markets, the Nigerian market
shows sufficiently proximate contempora-
neous small surges in transmission across
the years spanned by our samples, and
Venezuelan transmissions soar facing the
export shrinkage.
1. Despite positive transmissions during
the GFC complementing the findings of
DY for Saudi Arabia, the transmissions
are predominantly negative except for the
GFC.
2. Neutral to positive Israeli transmis-
sions span the entire sample period, with
small surges in the ensuing export shrink-
age and stronger surges during Iraq inva-
sion.
3. DY fails to capture the strong amplifi-
cations in the Kuwait market with the Iraq
invasion and export shrinkage. This sug-
gests the Kuwait market is on the rebound
as the Iraqi dominance subdues, becoming
a central oil exporting partner in the peri-
ods that follow.
4. DY patterns do not accord well with
MHD for Nigeria, and is not conducive to
explaining fundamentals driving Nigerian
market risk. DY fails to capture the damp-
ening of Nigerian markets during the oil
crisis following the Iraq invasion and also
transmissions surging with the USA bub-
ble. However, DY and MHD both identify
the build-up of Venezuelan hyperinflation
in the most recent period, as both show the
unprecedented rise in transmissions from
Venezuela.
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Table 3: Countries by Analytical Group
Exporters Commodity Oil Exporters Greek Crisis Asian Crisis Conduit
Exporters Countries
EC CE OE GRC AC CC
Australia Australia Canada Austria Australia Japan
China Canada Ecuador Belgium China USA
Chile France Iraq5 Croatia India
Germany Japan Israel Greece Malaysia
Nigeria New Zealand Kuwait Ireland Philippines
Norway UK Nigeria Portugal Singapore
Russia Saudi Arabia South Korea
Saudi Arabia Venezuela Sri Lanka
South Korea USA Thailand
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Table 4: Financial Crises in the sample period
Crisis events
Period Description
1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis Collapse of Thai baht, resulting in Thailand becoming effec-
tively bankrupt
1998-2000 Russian Financial Crisis Devaluation of the ruble followed by Russian Central Bank
defaulting on its debt
2000-2002 Dot-Com bubble Stock marker crash in 2002 followed by excessive speculations
prevalent in 1997-2000 together with the September 2011 ter-
rorist attack on US.
2003-2008 Global Energy Crisis Increasing tensions in Middle East together with rising con-
cerns over oil price speculations followed by a significant fall
of US dollar; resulted in oil prices rise abruptly, exceeding
three time the price at the beginning
2003 The SARS outbreak First identified in Guangdong province in China, rapidly took
an epidemic form worldwide, slowing down economic interac-
tions with China to many markets
2006 Gaza Conflict Israel-Lebanon war breaks out
2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis Subprime mortgage crisis followed by 2005 housing bubble
burst
2009-2012 Eurozone Crisis In the wake of Great recession in the late 2009 , several Eu-
rozone members (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus)
failed to bailout over-indebted banks and repay foreign debt
2014-2017 Russian Crisis Collapse of Russian ruble, followed by economic sanctions
imposed on Russia and the collapse of Russian stock markets
2016 Export Crisis Germany, Chile, France, China, UK, Australia among others
experience historic decline in total exports to others, followed
by the so-called ’oil-glut’
continue on the next page
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Table 4: Empirical Analysis comparing DY, MHD, SVD
Crisis events
Period Description
2015-2016 Chinese crisis A massive drop in Chinese stock markets results in markets
terminating transactions in the wake of concerns over a Chi-
nese Crisis
2013-present Venezuelan Crisis Termed as the Great depression of Venezuela, the deteri-
oration of major macro economic indicators in Venezuela
since 2013, resulted in significant social and political degrada-
tion. The extent of this deterioration is such, that Venezuela
topped the misery index 2013, and ranked lowest by the IFC
in investing country index.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics USA AUS IND JAP MYS NZL SGP
Min -6.629 -8.364 -9.852 -8.239 -19.017 -5.406 -8.848
Max 6.202 8.107 10.783 6.618 17.587 5.138 8.071
Median 0.049 0.069 0.106 0.037 0.022 0.062 0.047
Mean 0.018 0.021 0.038 0.009 0.019 0.017 0.026
Standard Deviation 0.817 1.026 1.244 0.965 1.105 0.832 0.993
JB test p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Critical Value 5.951 6.008 6.043 6.015 5.986 5.992 5.983
PHL KOR SLK THA NIG VEN KWT
Min -8.23 -12.50 -9.95 -10.25 -17.09 -145.75 -62.81
Max 13.890 12.320 11.797 15.888 6.777 20.320 62.554
Median 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.008 0.0043
Mean 0.024 0.044 0.025 0.034 0.007 -0.003 0.012
Standard Deviation 1.181 1.514 0.858 1.321 1.129 3.557 1.871
JB test p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Critical Value 6.019 5.975 5.987 5.988 6.005 5.995 5.996
IRQ SAU CHN ISR CAD GRC PRT
Min -41.219 -10.573 -7.863 -6.253 -9.432 -10.350 -7.060
Max 40.780 7.914 6.493 6.506 7.828 8.331 7.494
Median 0.000 0.008 0.020 0.063 0.084 0.064 0.039
Mean 0.027 0.022 0.036 0.028 0.019 -0.012 -0.008
Standard Deviation 2.508 1.013 1.243 0.986 0.985 1.523 1.041
JB test p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Critical Value 6.003 5.948 6.010 5.996 6.012 5.964 5.986
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics IRL BEL CRT AUT RUS NOR GER CHL UK FRA
Min -11.5 -6.9 -11.2 -7.5 -16.8 -10.8 -6.7 -6.2 -9.7 -6.9
Max 5.9 5.8 11.6 8.19 13.8 7.3 7.1 8.3 7.1 6.7
Median 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07
Mean 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.021 0.016 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Standard Deviation 1.06 0.95 1.16 1.01 1.809 1.258 1.14 0.82 0.94 1.02
JB test p Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Critical Value 5.98 6.02 5.96 5.97 5.97 6.03 6.03 5.94 5.95 6.0
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